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ARBITRATION AGREEMENT ARBITRAGE?:
STATUTORY DISCREPANCY LEADS TO THIRD CIRCUIT VICTORY
FOR DODD-FRANK WHISTLEBLOWER DEFENDANTS IN
KHAZIN v. TD AMERITRADE HOLDING CORP.
JOHN K. LISMAN*
“By holding that Dodd-Frank retaliation claims are not statutorily ex-
empt from enforcement of pre-dispute arbitration agreements, the
Third Circuit has handed employers a significant victory. . . .  Potential
plaintiffs will now have to weigh the pros and cons of asserting claims
under [Sarbanes-Oxley] . . . versus pursuing claims under Dodd-Frank
that may be subject to mandatory arbitration agreements.”1
I. INTRODUCTION: PROFITING FROM DISCREPANCY
In the recent proliferation of whistleblower activity in the financial
services sector, there is a new sort of arbitrage occurring.2  Arbitrage al-
lows investors to exploit inefficiencies and profit from a “price discrep-
ancy” between two markets.3  The new arbitrage is based on a statutory
discrepancy in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protec-
tion Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank).4  That discrepancy recently led to a major
victory for defendants in whistleblower anti-retaliation lawsuits.5
* J.D. Candidate, 2016, Villanova University School of Law; B.S, B.A. 2013,
American University.  Thanks to my family, especially my parents, John and Ellen
Lisman, for their continued support.  Thanks also to Kelsey Hughes-Blaum,
Managing Editor of Research & Writing, for going above and beyond in providing
thoughtful comments on this Casebrief.
1. Jyotin Hamid, Mary Beth Hogan, Jonathan R. Tuttle & Ada Fernandez
Johnson, Third Circuit Affirms Enforceability of Pre-Dispute Arbitration Agreements for
Whistleblower Claims Under Dodd-Frank, CLIENT UPDATE (Debevoise & Plimpton, New
York, N.Y. & Wash., D.C.), Dec. 17, 2014, at 2–3, available at http://
www.debevoise.com/~/media/files/insights/publications/2014/12/20141217a
%20third%20circuit%20affirms%20enforceability.pdf [http://perma.cc/Q7LF-
QE4M].
2. See generally Peter J. Henning, Tattletales Embraced as Whistle-Blower Programs
Gain Support, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2014, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/12/
01/tattletales-embraced-as-whistle-blower-programs-gain-support/ [http://perma.
cc/3FC4-XQK8] (outlining recent growth in whistleblower activity as among sev-
eral different legal provisions).
3. See generally Fixed Income Arbitrage Defined, HEDGETHINK (Oct. 28, 2014),
http://www.hedgethink.com/education/fixed-income-arbitrage-defined/ [http:/
/perma.cc/7QN4-ZXC8] (labeling “the presence of a price discrepancy between
the two markets” for product as “[t]he backbone of arbitrage” and describing buy-
ing and selling activity of arbitrage which allows profit realization).
4. See Hamid et al., supra note 1, at 1 (reviewing statutory issue).
5. See id. (stating holding of Khazin v. TD Ameritrade Holding Corp., 773
F.3d 488 (3d Cir. 2014)).
(753)
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Dodd-Frank aimed to reform the American financial services sector.6
Part of this reform included increased engagement of whistleblowers.7
One section of Dodd-Frank created a new whistleblower program to be
administered by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).  Other
sections of Dodd-Frank amended anti-retaliation provisions in separate
laws meant to protect whistleblowers (e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
(SOX)).8  Those amendments invalidated predispute arbitration agree-
ments included in employment contracts, which now guarantee
whistleblowers their day in court.9  Oddly omitted from the section of
Dodd-Frank governing the new SEC program, however, was a provision
invalidating predispute arbitration agreements.10
With the groundbreaking decision in Khazin v. TD Ameritrade Holding
Corp.,11 the Third Circuit became the first federal circuit court to address
that omission.12  Many commentators believed Dodd-Frank intended to
nullify whistleblower arbitration agreements altogether, including those
enacted under the new SEC program.13  Much to their surprise, the Third
6. See Clea Benson, Obama Pledges to Veto Measures Weakening Dodd-Frank,
BLOOMBERG (Jan. 20, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2015-
01-21/obama-pledges-to-veto-measures-weakening-dodd-frank-finance-law [http://
perma.cc/FF2J-MWJX] (noting initial congressional approval of Dodd-Frank
aimed at post-crisis reform).
7. See Owen Davis, Wall Street Whistleblowers: After the Largest Leak in Banking
History, Are They Safe?, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Feb. 9, 2015), http://www.ibtimes.com/
wall-street-whistleblowers-after-largest-leak-banking-history-are-they-safe-1810474
[http://perma.cc/9C27-XLQ3] (noting “raft of provisions” in Dodd-Frank aimed
at increasing whistleblower activity).
8. See Steven Davidoff Solomon, Whistle-Blower Awards Lure Wrongdoers Looking
to Score, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 2014, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/12/30/
whistle-blower-awards-lure-wrongdoers-looking-to-score/?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/
FA4U-7ZKC] (providing overview of new SEC whistleblower program instituted by
Dodd-Frank).  For a further discussion of Dodd-Frank enactments of and amend-
ments to anti-retaliation provisions, see infra notes 31–50 and accompanying text.
9. For a further discussion of amendments invalidating predispute arbitration
agreements, see infra notes 41–47 and accompanying text.
10. For a further discussion of this omission in the Dodd-Frank laws gov-
erning the new SEC program, see infra notes 36–41 and accompanying text.
11. 773 F.3d 488 (3d Cir. 2014).
12. See Christopher J. Oberst, You Can (Maybe) Arbitrate That: Arbitration and the
Dodd-Frank Act, BLOOMBERG BNA (Jan. 22, 2015), http://www.bna.com/maybe-ar
bitrate-arbitration-b17179922421/ [http://perma.cc/9DZX-9PPJ] (noting that
Third Circuit is first appeals court to rule on this issue).
13. See Hamid et al., supra note 1, at 1 (“The [Khazin] decision is noteworthy
in part because most commentary following the passage of Dodd-Frank assumed
that the restrictions on pre-dispute arbitration in the Act applied to claims brought
under the [new SEC program].”).  For the impact on practitioners, see Susanna M.
Buergel et al., Third Circuit Holds That Parties to Arbitration Agreements Can Compel
Arbitration of Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Claims, CLIENT MEMORANDUM (Paul Weiss,
New York, N.Y.), Dec. 16, 2014, http://www.paulweiss.com/media/2738612/
16dec14alert.pdf [http://perma.cc/UZE3-9UNF] (speculating that Khazin will
spur more similar decisions and noting implications of decision).
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Circuit compelled arbitration of an anti-retaliation claim based on the
omission.14
This Casebrief analyzes how the Khazin decision is a victory for de-
fendants and should inform future practitioner decisions in whistleblower
litigation.15  Part II reviews the history of whistleblower law, Dodd-Frank,
and related jurisprudence.16  Part III analyzes the Third Circuit’s resolu-
tion of the omission issue in Khazin.17  Part IV positions the opinion within
other narrow interpretations of Dodd-Frank whistleblower law, revealing
that the current precedent is advantageous for defendants.18  Part V con-
siders the implications of Khazin and recommends that defendants employ
arbitration agreements and plaintiffs consider approaching their
whistleblower claims differently.19  Though the Khazin defendants arbi-
traged this statutory discrepancy in Dodd-Frank, plaintiffs can still effec-
tively plan to avoid arbitration agreements.20
II. UNDERSTANDING THE MARKET: A BACKGROUND OF WHISTLEBLOWER
LAW, DODD-FRANK, AND SURROUNDING JURISPRUDENCE
Despite the broad historical roots of whistleblower protection in other
jurisdictions, American law has only recently come to embrace
whistleblowers.21  Dodd-Frank followed in that progression, seeking to em-
ploy whistleblowers to combat further financial industry fraud.22  In the
years since the enactment of Dodd-Frank, its whistleblower provisions have
spurred a flurry of jurisprudence.23
14. See Khazin, 773 F.3d at 489 (noting ultimate decision to compel arbitra-
tion of plaintiff’s claim).
15. For a further discussion of the manner in which Khazin represents a vic-
tory for defendants and should inform practitioners, see infra notes 173–94 and
accompanying text.
16. For a further discussion of the history of whistleblower law, Dodd-Frank,
and surrounding jurisprudence, see infra notes 24–99 and accompanying text.
17. For a further discussion of the facts and decision in Khazin, see infra notes
102–21 and accompanying text.
18. For a further discussion of how Khazin is positioned within jurisprudence
regarding other narrow interpretations of Dodd-Frank whistleblower law and the
manner in which that advantages defendants, see infra notes 122–72 and accompa-
nying text.
19. For a further discussion of the implications of Khazin and recommenda-
tions to practitioners, see infra notes 173–98 and accompanying text.
20. See supra note 19.
21. For a further discussion of the history of whistleblower law, see infra notes
24–30 and accompanying text. Whistleblowers are defined as people who report
information on wrongdoing gleaned from their employment with a company.
22. For a further discussion of the whistleblower provisions of Dodd-Frank,
see infra notes 35–50 and accompanying text.
23. See supra note 22.
3
Lisman: Arbitration Agreement Arbitrage?: Statutory Discrepancy Leads to
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2016
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\60-4\VLR404.txt unknown Seq: 4 19-NOV-15 15:04
756 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60: p. 753
A. Growing Value: A Brief History of Whistleblower Law
Modern whistleblower provisions developed from broad historical un-
derpinnings.24  Before 2006, American law failed to protect
whistleblowers.25  The False Claims Act (FCA), commonly credited as the
24. See Norman D. Bishara, Elletta Sangrey Callahan & Terry Morehead Dwor-
kin, The Mouth of Truth, 10 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 37, 39 (2013) (recounting historical
Venetian whistleblowing system); Lucienne M. Hartmann, Comment, Whistle While
You Work: The Fairytale-Like Whistleblower Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act and the Emer-
gence of “Greedy,” the Eighth Dwarf, 62 MERCER L. REV. 1279, 1280 (2011) (identifying
origination of term whistleblower in English law enforcement).
The proliferation of whistleblower anti-retaliation protections is also a recent
phenomenon. Compare John Ashcroft, Catherine Hanaway & Claudia L. On˜ate
Greim, Whistleblowers Cash In, Unwary Corporations Pay, 40 HOFSTRA L. REV. 367, 369
(2011) (identifying “ancient lineage” of federal whistleblower incentives as begin-
ning with False Claims Act (FCA) during Civil War), with Joel D. Hesch,
Whistleblower Rights and Protections: Critiquing Federal Whistleblower Laws and Recom-
mending Filling in Missing Pieces to Form a Beautiful Patchwork Quilt, 6 LIBERTY U. L.
REV. 51, 56 (2011) (noting ineffectiveness of FCA provisions prior to 1986 amend-
ments to law and identifying 1986 as turning point for law).
Recent crises have spurred more societal interest and have contributed to
changing societal tones toward individual whistleblowers. See id. at 52–53 (point-
ing out “rapidly changing” attitudes towards whistleblowers and recounting posi-
tive societal acknowledgement of whistleblowers).  Figures reviewing annual
whistleblower activity in 2014 show huge growth, further evidencing how recently
the whistleblowing phenomenon originated. See Solomon, supra note 8 (referenc-
ing 2014 as “banner year for whistleblowers”).
25. See Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Mutiny by the Bounties? The Attempt to Reform
Wall Street by the New Whistleblower Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act, 2012 BYU L. REV.
73, 80 (2012) (detailing former lack of federal legal protection for whistleblowers
and ineffective “patchwork” of state law protections).  Prior to the enactment of
federal whistleblower protections, individuals who reported wrongdoing effectively
waded into a minefield. See id. at 80–81 (describing several particularly problem-
atic points of historical whistleblower law).  Importantly, historical whistleblower
law seemed to disincentivize reporting of securities law violations. See id. at 81
(pointing out New York state law renders potential whistleblowers susceptible to
weak protection, if any, and thus deters reporting).
For the definition of whistleblower, see Bishara et al., supra note 24, at 43
(“We espouse the following widely-used definition: ‘whistle-blowers are organiza-
tion members (including former members and job applicants) who disclose illegal,
immoral, or illegitimate practices (including omissions) under the control of their
employers, to persons or organizations who may be able to effect action.’”); Hart-
mann, supra note 24, at 1280 (describing understanding as “an employee exter-
nally reporting fraudulent actions of the employer-company to the federal
government”).
Industry-specific whistleblower laws dictate a more pointed definition. See gen-
erally Rapp, supra, at 85 (comparing whistleblower protections provided for in
Sarbanes-Oxley Act with eventual legislative developments leading to whistleblower
protections in Dodd-Frank Act); see also Thomas S. Markey, Note, “Whistleblower”
Redefined: Implications of the Recent Interpretive Split on the Dodd-Frank Whistleblower
Anti-Retaliation Provision, 33 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 441, 446 (2014) (reviewing split
interpretations on definitional ambiguity); Peter J. Henning, Who Is a Whistle-
Blower? The Courts Weigh In, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2015, available at http://deal
book.nytimes.com/2015/01/05/who-is-a-whistle-blower-the-courts-weigh-in/?_r=0
[http://perma.cc/8MSV-2R79] (noting definitional “ambiguity” of Dodd-Frank
anti-retaliation provision).
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first American whistleblower law, provides a basis for many of the modern
statutes.26
Modern anti-retaliation protections in Dodd-Frank and other
whistleblower laws recognize the spectrum of risks and rewards
whistleblowers encounter.27  On one hand, whistleblowers often receive
Whistleblower narratives can arise in any number of contexts in both the pri-
vate and public sectors. See, e.g., Susan Carey, United Flight Attendants File
Whistleblower Complaint, WALL ST. J., Jan. 7, 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/
united-flight-attendants-file-whistleblower-complaint-1420663426 [http://
perma.cc/4HFV-HEFH] (recounting whistleblower claim brought by flight attend-
ants); Norman Solomon, Why Jeffrey Sterling Deserves Support as a CIA Whistleblower,
HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 5, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/norman-solo
mon/why-jeffrey-sterling-dese_b_6414952.html [http://perma.cc/SYU4-5PAN]
(discussing Central Intelligence Agency whistleblower).
26. See generally Patrick A. Barthle II, Note, Whistling Rogues: A Comparative
Analysis of the Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Bounty Program, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1201,
1217–20 (2012) (discussing historical development of FCA).  Though the FCA
originated during the Civil War, the 1986 amendments to the Act are seen as the
major turning point for whistleblower law. See id. at 1218–20 (labeling 1986
amendments as forming “current version” of FCA); Hesch, supra note 24, at 56
(indicating ineffective nature of FCA prior to passage of 1986 amendments).  The
post-1986 FCA is widely recognized as successful and has effectuated huge recov-
eries. See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Recovers $2.4 Billion
in False Claims Cases in Fiscal Year 2009; More Than $24 Billion Since 1986 (Nov.
19, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-recovers-
24-billion-false-claims-cases-fiscal-year-2009-more-24-billion [http://perma.cc/
B295-2B27] (reporting total FCA recoveries since 1986 amendments of $24 bil-
lion); Solomon, supra note 8 (referencing Department of Justice report stating
over $6 billion was recovered under FCA in 2014).
Additionally, Dodd-Frank and other whistleblower protections trace their
roots to the FCA. See Barthle, supra, at 1217 (noting FCA served as model for
Dodd-Frank and other whistleblower laws); see also Bishara et al., supra note 24, at
41 (marking 1986 amendments to FCA as “key trend” toward incentivizing
whistleblowing through monetary rewards). The FCA allows for suits to stymie
fraud against the federal government. See Hesch, supra note 24, at 55–56 (labeling
FCA “the government’s primary enforcement tool in combatting fraud”).
The FCA uniquely allows for whistleblower activity through a qui tam species of
lawsuits. See generally Barthle, supra, at 1217–18 (providing description of historical
basis of qui tam suits). Qui tam suits provide causes of action for whistleblowers
acting on behalf of the government. See id. at 1217 (defining qui tam actions as
those in which “private citizens . . . can bring a suit on behalf of the United States”
and share in recoveries under that suit).  Whistleblower activity under the FCA has
been measurable. See Umang Desai, Comment, Crying Foul: Whistleblower Provisions
of the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, 43 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 427, 441 (2012) (outlining success
of FCA and stating that over $24 billion has been collected by government thanks
to FCA activity since 1986 amendments); see also Hesch, supra note 24, at 56 (not-
ing $12 billion recovered under FCA actions from 1996 to 2006 and attributing
large percentage to qui tam actions).
27. See Erika Kelton, The War on Dodd-Frank Whistleblowers—How Wall Street
Gags, Intimidates and Fights the Fraud Fighters, FORBES (Jan. 5, 2015), http://
www.forbes.com/sites/erikakelton/2015/01/05/the-war-on-dodd-frank-whistle
blowers-how-wall-street-gags-intimidates-and-fights-the-fraud-fighters/ [http://
perma.cc/H5KH-WZCC] (commenting on methods to suppress whistleblowing).
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high monetary rewards for reporting wrongdoing.28  On the other hand,
blowing the whistle could potentially result in loss of employment and
alienation in an industry.29  In extreme cases, whistleblowers can be left
out in the cold, completely unprotected, and without any remedy.30
B. Investing in Whistleblowers: Dodd-Frank
There are three important aspects of the Dodd-Frank whistleblower
provisions that put the law in perspective.31  First, Dodd-Frank created a
new SEC program aimed at increasing whistleblower incentives and pro-
tections.32  Second, Dodd-Frank amended other whistleblower laws by ad-
ding provisions that invalidate predispute arbitration agreements, but
nevertheless omitted these provisions from the sections governing the new
SEC program.33  Third, the new Dodd-Frank SEC program has elicited
criticism for several shortcomings.34
1. The New SEC Whistleblower Program
The economic crises that plagued America in 2008 were, in many
ways, the driving force behind the development of Dodd-Frank.35  The
whistleblower provisions of Dodd-Frank were merely one aspect of many
28. See Daniel Fisher with Shanti Atkins, SEC’s Secret $30 Million Whistleblower
Case Won’t Improve Corporate Behavior, FORBES (Sept. 25, 2014), http://www.forbes.
com/sites/danielfisher/2014/09/25/secs-secret-30-million-whistleblower-case-
wont-improve-corporate-behavior/ [http://perma.cc/2T23-6TCZ] (reviewing $30
million award); Henning, supra note 2 (detailing $104 million and $30 million
whistleblower awards).
29. See Ashcroft et al., supra note 24, at 407 (describing issues encountered by
whistleblowers as being typecast as “problem employees,” responses of “alienation,
isolation, and hostility,” and treatment as “snitches”); Jennifer M. Pacella, Inside or
Out? The Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Program’s Antiretaliation Protections for Internal Re-
porting, 86 TEMP. L. REV. 721, 753 (2014) (stating that choosing to blow whistle can
be “devastating to [whistleblower’s] livelihood”).
30. See Scott Patterson & Jenny Strasburg, Source’s Cover Blown by SEC, WALL
ST. J., Apr. 25, 2012, 9:22 AM, http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702
303459004577363683833934726 [http://perma.cc/5PYL-W9JH] (recounting story
of whistleblower whose identity was inadvertently exposed by SEC). But see George
S. Canellos, Letter on SEC Did Not Blow Source’s Cover, WALL ST. J., Apr. 25, 2012,
6:23 PM, http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240527023048113045773663
81288135106 [http://perma.cc/7GPV-HT42] (disagreeing that SEC inadvertently
exposed source).
31. See infra notes 32–34 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 35–40 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 41–47 and accompanying text.
34. See infra notes 48–50 and accompanying text.
35. See Pacella, supra note 29, at 726 (describing climate of 2008 financial cri-
sis as prompting Dodd-Frank); Sara L. Reid & Serena B. David, The Evolution of the
SEC Whistleblower: From Sarbanes-Oxley to Dodd-Frank, 129 BANKING L.J. 907, 909
(2012) (noting Dodd-Frank attempted to improve on former programs); Rachel S.
Taylor, A Cultural Revolution: The Demise of Corporate Culture Through the Whistleblower
Bounty Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act, 15 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 69, 69
(2013) (stating Dodd-Frank was direct response to crisis); Jessica Luhrs, Note, En-
couraging Litigation: Why Dodd-Frank Goes Too Far in Eliminating the Procedural Difficul-
6
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subsequent undertakings for reform.36  Though the whistleblower provi-
sions are a small part of larger legislation, many characterize them as a
prominent part of the law.37
Dodd-Frank established its own unique whistleblower program to be
run by the SEC.38  The program utilizes a “bounty” model based on finan-
cial incentives for whistleblower reports.39  In a parallel effort, the sections
governing this program include anti-retaliation provisions, which prohibit
retaliation, establish a cause of action, and make certain forms of relief
available.40
ties in Sarbanes-Oxley, 8 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 175, 175 (2012) (describing 2008
financial crisis prompting Dodd-Frank).
36. See Pacella, supra note 29, at 726–27 (noting whistleblower sections “are
just a few” of multitude of Dodd-Frank provisions); Luhrs, supra note 35, at 175–76
(outlining several additional changes effected by Dodd-Frank).
37. See Ashcroft et al., supra note 24, at 372 (describing one goal of Dodd-
Frank program was “to counterbalance the potential chilling effect” of whistleblow-
ing risks); Pacella, supra note 29, at 727 (characterizing Dodd-Frank in part as aim-
ing to grow whistleblower activity); Rapp, supra note 25, at 85 (referring to
characterization of Dodd-Frank program as potentially contributing to huge ad-
vancement of whistleblower activity); Desai, supra note 26, at 447 (outlining one
goal of Dodd-Frank as fraud deterrence).
38. See infra notes 39–40.  Prior to the passage of Dodd-Frank, the SEC ran a
whistleblower program available only for reports of insider trading that was largely
unsuccessful. See Ashcroft et al., supra note 24, at 372 (noting former program
“resulted in . . . $159,537 paid to . . . five claimants.”).
39. See Ashcroft et al., supra note 24, at 380 (describing theory of program);
see also id. (reviewing final structure of program as promulgated in SEC rules pur-
suant to Dodd-Frank provision as awarding “between ten to thirty percent of col-
lected monetary sanctions to whistleblowers who (i) voluntarily provide the SEC
(ii) with original information about a violation of the securities laws (iii) that leads
to the successful enforcement of an action brought by the SEC (iv) resulting in
monetary sanctions exceeding $1 million” (footnotes omitted)); Desai, supra note
26, at 448 (identifying aim of unique approach of Dodd-Frank bounty model as
increasing benefits and “significant incentives” available to whistleblowers);
Meghan Elizabeth King, Note, Blowing the Whistle on the Dodd-Frank Amendments: The
Case Against the New Amendments to Whistleblower Protection in Section 806 of Sarbanes-
Oxley, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1457, 1463 (2011) (describing bounty program
requirements).
Though the Dodd-Frank program is not the only one based on a “bounty”
model, the law independently enlarged potential financial bounties. See Barthle,
supra note 26, at 1207 (pointing out changes in new program, notably increased
cap on awards of “10% mandatory floor, with a possible reward up to . . . 30%” and
removal of complete agency discretion as to decision on whether to pay bounties);
King, supra, at 1463 (specifying that whistleblowers who meet requirements now
“automatically receive a bounty award”).  For a discussion of the bounty model, see
Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Beyond Protection: Invigorating Incentives For Sarbanes-
Oxley Corporate and Securities Fraud Whistleblowers, 87 B.U. L. REV. 91 (2007).
40. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A) (2012) (prohibiting retaliation); id. § 78u-
6(h)(1)(B) (outlining cause of action); id. § 78u-6(h)(1)(C) (outlining potential
forms of relief); Ashcroft et al., supra note 24, at 384 (reviewing “two-tiered” retalia-
tion protections in Dodd-Frank); Pacella, supra note 29, at 723 (describing specific
prohibitions on retaliation against whistleblowers).
7
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2. Predispute Arbitration Agreement Amendments
In addition to establishing the new SEC program, Dodd-Frank also
amended whistleblower provisions in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
(SOX), the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA), and the Consumer Finan-
cial Protection Act of 2010 (CFPA).41  In part, Dodd-Frank added similar
provisions to invalidate predispute arbitration agreements to the anti-retal-
iation sections of SOX, CEA, and CFPA.42
41. See generally Luhrs, supra note 35, at 179–81 (providing overview of Dodd-
Frank amendments to other laws).  Dodd-Frank also amended the FCA
whistleblower provisions. See Mark J. Oberti, New Wave of Employment Retaliation and
Whistleblowing, 38 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 43, 99–100 (2012) (discussing Dodd-Frank
FCA amendment).
42. See infra note 44.  SOX preceded Dodd-Frank, but Dodd-Frank and SOX
(and its original whistleblower provisions) were enacted for similar purposes. See
Desai, supra note 26, at 441–42 (reviewing motivations behind passage of original
version of SOX); Samuel C. Leifer, Note, Protecting Whistleblower Protections in the
Dodd-Frank Act, 113 MICH. L. REV. 121, 126 (2014) (pointing out motivations be-
hind original SOX whistleblower program).
SOX whistleblower provisions are structurally different from those in Dodd-
Frank. See Pacella, supra note 29, at 729 (outlining differences in SOX program,
such as requirement to file original complaint with administrative agency, shorter
statute of limitations, and narrower relief available).  The initial SOX
whistleblower efforts were largely unproductive. See id. at 729–30 (reviewing inef-
fectiveness of SOX); Leifer, supra, at 128–29 (outlining research indicating failures
of original SOX program).  Some believe Dodd-Frank was informed by the lack of
success in SOX. See Reid & David, supra note 35, at 909 (stating Dodd-Frank
sought to “address the deficiencies” of unsuccessful programs passed as compo-
nents of former legislation).  Dodd-Frank also amended the CEA to include a
nearly identical whistleblower program of its own, relative to commodities law vio-
lations. See Oberti, supra note 41, at 98–99 (outlining program and protections
created by Dodd-Frank by way of amendments to CEA).  Finally, Dodd-Frank in-
serted additional anti-retaliation measures in the CFPA. See id. at 97 (describing
anti-retaliation measures put in place by Dodd-Frank relative to reporting under
CFPA).
For a discussion of the similarities in the different laws, see infra note 49 and
accompanying text. See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(e)(1)-(2) (2012).
(e) Nonenforceability of certain provisions waiving rights and remedies
or requiring arbitration of disputes.—
(1) Waiver of rights and remedies.—The rights and remedies pro-
vided for in this section may not be waived by any agreement, policy
form, or condition of employment, including by a predispute arbitra-
tion agreement.
(2) Predispute arbitration agreements.—No predispute arbitration
agreement shall be valid or enforceable, if the agreement requires
arbitration of a dispute arising under this section.
id.; 7 U.S.C. § 26(n) (2012).
(n) Nonenforceability of certain provisions waiving rights and remedies
or requiring arbitration of disputes
(1) Waiver of rights and remedies
The rights and remedies provided for in this section may not be
waived by any agreement, policy form, or condition of employment
including by a predispute arbitration agreement.
(2) Predispute arbitration agreements
8
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Notably, however, Dodd-Frank did not invalidate predispute arbitra-
tion agreements in the sections governing the new SEC whistleblower pro-
gram.43  The legislative history of Dodd-Frank indicates that some level of
commentary recommended including a predispute arbitration provision
in the SEC whistleblower program laws.44  At least one commentator
pointed out that this omission from Dodd-Frank could leave a gaping hole
in the new SEC program.45  Congress and the SEC were aware of this
No predispute arbitration agreement shall be valid or enforcea-
ble, if the agreement requires arbitration of a dispute arising
under this section.
id.; 12 U.S.C. § 5567(d) (2012).
(d) Unenforceability of certain agreements
(1) No waiver of rights and remedies
Except as provided under paragraph (3), and notwithstanding any
other provision of law, the rights and remedies provided for in this
section may not be waived by any agreement, policy, form, or condi-
tion of employment, including by any predispute arbitration
agreement.
(2) No predispute arbitration agreements
Except as provided under paragraph (3), and notwithstanding any
other provision of law, no predispute arbitration agreement shall be
valid or enforceable to the extent that it requires arbitration of a
dispute arising under this section.
(3) Exception
Notwithstanding paragraphs (1) and (2), an arbitration provision in
a collective bargaining agreement shall be enforceable as to disputes
arising under subsection (a)(4), unless the Bureau determines, by
rule, that such provision is inconsistent with the purposes of this title.
Id.  The inclusion of such a provision in the SOX amendments has been viewed as
an indication of congressional intent favoring strong whistleblower protections.
See Bradley Mark Nerderman, Note, Should Courts Apply Dodd-Frank’s Prohibition on
the Enforcement of Pre-Dispute Arbitration Agreements Retroactively?, 98 IOWA L. REV.
2141, 2154 (2013) (noting that invalidation of predispute arbitration agreements
represents greater protection for whistleblowers than former version of SOX and is
meant “to encourage whistleblowing”); id. at 2157 (referring to scholarly consen-
sus that former version of SOX was ineffective because companies kept and em-
ployed power to head off whistleblower activity through use of arbitration
agreements).  That congressional intent might also stand for a broader intent to
rid “the securities industry” as a whole of arbitration agreements. See Catherine
Moore, Note, The Effect of the Dodd-Frank Act on Arbitration Agreements: A Proposal for
Consumer Choice, 12 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 503, 518 (2012) (arguing that Congress
meant to stop use of arbitration agreements in whistleblower context).
43. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)-(j) (outlining Dodd-Frank’s specific cause of ac-
tion and potential remedies).
44. See Pacella, supra note 29, at 731 (noting “several commentators” wanted
anti-arbitration clause in provisions governing SEC program).
45. See Letter from Daniel J. Kaiser, Partner, Kaiser Saurborn & Mair, P.C., to
SEC (Dec. 2, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-33-10/s73310-
27.pdf [http://perma.cc/SH48-GUHT] (“Of course, the same reasons the no
waiver language is necessary for the companion Commodities whistleblower sec-
tion, which is nearly identical in all respects, are equally applicable to the SEC
whistleblower section.  Otherwise, the SEC whistleblower provision will be eviscer-
ated by employers who will include waiver language in every document their em-
ploye[es] sign.  In short, the program will be gutted . . . .  I respectfully suggest that
9
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omission when drafting Dodd-Frank.46  Despite these concerns, the provi-
sions governing the new SEC program are undoubtedly silent on arbitra-
tion agreements.47
3. Criticisms of the New SEC Whistleblower Program
Years after its enactment, criticisms regarding the nuances of the SEC
whistleblower program remain.48  Given the federal government’s usual
preference for arbitration, some have criticized the invalidation of arbitra-
tion agreements as inappropriate.49  And despite the seemingly noble
goals of Dodd-Frank, others are unconvinced that the law will actually lead
whistleblowers to expose wrongdoing, while some believe the
whistleblower provisions threaten internal corporate structures.50
C. A Successful Model?: Cases Interpreting Dodd-Frank
In the years since the passage of Dodd-Frank, courts have parsed out
numerous issues with the law, creating three categories of jurisprudence
that are important to review.51  First, in addition to the Third Circuit, two
other federal courts have addressed the absence of an arbitration provi-
sion in laws governing the new SEC whistleblower program.52  Second, two
the Commission carefully consider this issue and consider fixes that implement
Congress’ intention on the ‘no waiver’ clause.”).
46. See id. (reviewing commentary submitted during drafting stage of Dodd-
Frank).
47. For a discussion of the absence of arbitration agreements in the new SEC
program, see infra notes 55–67 and accompanying text.
48. For a summary of criticisms of the SEC whistleblower program, see infra
notes 49–50 and accompanying text.
49. See Imre S. Szalai, An Obituary for the Federal Arbitration Act: An Older Cousin
to Modern Civil Procedure, 2010 J. DISP. RESOL. 391, 428 (2010) (citing Dodd-Frank’s
invalidation of several sorts of arbitration agreements as evidence “Congress has
been chipping away at” federal preference for arbitration).  This federal prefer-
ence originated with the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) in 1925. See id. at 391–92
(describing “groundbreaking” nature of FAA in endorsing arbitration agree-
ments).  Jurisprudence has broadened the FAA since its passage. See id. at 392
(noting judicial expansion of FAA).
50. See Ashcroft et al., supra note 24, at 371 (discussing “perverse incentive”
and “conflict of interest” underlying bounty program in that whistleblowers might
harbor information as opposed to reporting it immediately to increase their poten-
tial bounty); id. at 380 (mentioning Dodd-Frank scheme as encouraging reporting
“potentially entirely in lieu” of any internal compliance system existing within com-
pany); Taylor, supra note 35, at 70 (arguing that Dodd-Frank may affect larger
threat to corporate culture); Dave Ebersole, Note, Blowing the Whistle on the Dodd-
Frank Whistleblower Provisions, 6 OHIO ST. ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 123, 135–43
(2011) (outlining negative aspects of bounty program); Hartmann, supra note 24,
at 1305–07 (outlining how Dodd-Frank whistleblower provisions have potential to
increase frivolous claims); Luhrs, supra note 35, at 182–84 (reviewing manner in
which program has potential to increase “meritless” litigation); id. at 183 (noting
“strong incentives to bypass internal . . . measures”).
51. See infra notes 52–54 and accompanying text.
52. For a further discussion of these cases, see infra notes 55–67 and accompa-
nying text.
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district courts in the Third Circuit have analyzed other Dodd-Frank
whistleblower issues (e.g., retroactive applicability of the Dodd-Frank
amendments).53  Third, federal district and circuit courts nationally have
ruled on other aspects of the Dodd-Frank whistleblower provisions, includ-
ing a definitional issue, extraterritorial applicability of the law, and retro-
active applicability.54  These three broad categories of jurisprudence
reveal an arguably narrow overall construction of Dodd-Frank, which pro-
vides a helpful reference point when analyzing the Khazin decision.
1. Absence of a Predispute Arbitration Provision in New SEC Program
Provisions
District court decisions conflict on the issue of pre-arbitration dispute
agreements: two federal district courts have upheld predispute arbitration
agreements against plaintiffs alleging whistleblower retaliation under
Dodd-Frank and one did not.55
In Ruhe v. Masimo Corp.,56 former employees of a public medical de-
vice manufacturer brought a whistleblower suit alleging unethical prac-
tices and defective product cover-ups.57  The United States District Court
for the Central District of California compelled arbitration pursuant to an
agreement signed by the employees.58  The court refused the plaintiffs’
request to read a provision invalidating predispute arbitration agreements
into Dodd-Frank.59
53. For a further discussion of these other Third Circuit opinions, see infra
notes 68–80 and accompanying text.
54. For a further discussion of this national jurisprudence, see infra notes
81–99 and accompanying text.
55. For an examination of two federal district courts’ analysis in upholding
the arbitration agreements, see infra notes 56–67 and accompanying text.
56. No. SACV 11-00734-CJC(JCGx), 2011 WL 4442790 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 16,
2011), appeal docketed, No. 14-55556 (9th Cir. Apr. 7, 2014), and appeal docketed, No.
14-55725 (9th Cir. May 2, 2014).
57. See id. at *1 (describing complaint as alleging “constructive discharge in
violation” of Dodd-Frank anti-retaliation provisions).
58. See id. at *5 (summarizing failure of each argument lodged by plaintiffs
against motion to compel and resolving motion in favor of defendants).  The arbi-
tration agreement was signed in tandem with a confidentiality agreement at the
commencement of plaintiffs’ employment. See id. at *1 (detailing arbitration and
confidentiality agreements).
59. See id. at *4 (declining to “read the arbitration provision from the
Sarbanes-Oxley” into the Dodd-Frank anti-retaliation provision).  The court com-
pared the Dodd-Frank provision to the amendments Dodd-Frank made to the SEA
and SOX. See id. (describing omission of provision from Dodd-Frank invalidating
arbitration agreements and juxtaposing omission against Dodd-Frank amendments
including such provisions).  The court found any evidence supporting the proposi-
tion of reading an anti-arbitration clause into Dodd-Frank “insufficient.” See id.
(noting plaintiffs’ arguments were “insufficient . . . to conclude that Congress un-
intentionally omitted this provision”).
11
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Similarly, the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York issued a decision in Murray v. UBS Securities, LLC60 compelling
arbitration of a plaintiff’s Dodd-Frank anti-retaliation claim.61  The court
held that given the absence of any invalidating provision in Dodd-Frank,
the arbitration agreement governed.62  In making its decision, the court
focused on a strong federal preference for arbitration, differences be-
tween Dodd-Frank and other whistleblower protections, and congressional
intent implicit in the Act’s statutory construction.63
The Fourth Circuit’s decision in Santoro v. Accenture Federal Services,
LLC,64 went in a different direction than the two decisions above and im-
plied that all whistleblower claims brought under Dodd-Frank are barred
from arbitration.65  However, the Santoro decision does not specifically re-
gard the predispute arbitration issue.66  The court did not distinguish be-
tween the causes of action in the SEC program provisions and the
amended SOX, CEA, and CFPA provisions.67
2. Dodd-Frank Jurisprudence in the Third Circuit
Third Circuit jurisprudence on other aspects of Dodd-Frank
whistleblower law indicates an overall narrow interpretation of several
other open Dodd-Frank questions.68  In Sefen v. Animas Corp.,69 the District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania addressed potential retroac-
tive application of the Dodd-Frank amendments to the FCA.70  A
whistleblower alleged that his employer engaged in wrongful conduct in
violation of the FCA.71  To avoid being barred by the statute of limitations,
the plaintiff attempted to apply a Dodd-Frank amendment to the FCA.72
60. No. 12 Civ. 5914(KPF), 2014 WL 285093 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 27, 2014).
61. See id. at *14 (granting motion to compel arbitration and stay
proceeding).
62. See id. at *10 (declining to extend protection of SOX provision because
claims arose under Dodd-Frank provision).
63. See id. at *10–11 (discussing preference for arbitration, reasoning of Ruhe
court, other decisions declining to extend Dodd-Frank amendments to other stat-
utes, and text of Dodd-Frank itself).
64. 748 F.3d 217 (4th Cir. 2014).  In Santoro, the Fourth Circuit addressed a
plaintiff’s argument to expand the Dodd-Frank arbitration agreement prohibi-
tions. See id. at 220 (describing plaintiff’s arguments).
65. See id.
66. See id. (noting issue of whether Dodd-Frank invalidation of arbitration
agreements “prohibits the arbitration of non-whistleblower claims”).
67. See id. at 223 (referring to Dodd-Frank “causes of action” generally but
failing to distinguish as between them).
68. For an examination of Third Circuit jurisprudence on Dodd-Frank’s
whistleblower provisions, see infra notes 72–85 and accompanying text.
69. No. 10–2971, 2014 WL 2710957 (E.D. Pa. June 13, 2014).
70. See id. at *4 (describing plaintiff’s argument that claim was not barred by
statute of limitations).
71. See id. at *1 (outlining allegations of plaintiff).
72. See id. at *4 (describing failure of amendment to clearly denote “effective
date” or retroactivity).
12
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 60, Iss. 4 [2016], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol60/iss4/4
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\60-4\VLR404.txt unknown Seq: 13 19-NOV-15 15:04
2015] CASEBRIEF 765
Driven by a lack of clarity in the statute directly supporting retroactive
application, the court held that the plaintiff failed to meet the statute of
limitations.73
In Safarian v. American DG Energy, Inc.,74 the District Court of New
Jersey addressed alleged retaliation.75  The plaintiff attempted to invoke
the protections of the Dodd-Frank anti-retaliation provision.76  Declining
to address what constitutes a whistleblower under the Act, the court in-
stead found that the disclosures made by the plaintiff were not a category
protected by Dodd-Frank.77
Finally, in Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp. v. U.S. Department of La-
bor,78 the Third Circuit briefly spoke again on its general interpretation of
anti-retaliation provisions and addressed a non-Dodd-Frank anti-retalia-
tion statute.79  The Third Circuit made clear that as a general principle of
interpreting anti-retaliation statutes, the plain text will always “trump” in-
tent-based arguments.80
3. Dodd-Frank Jurisprudence Nationally
Nationally, courts have addressed three other issues of Dodd-Frank
whistleblower law and have chosen to resolve these issues narrowly.81
First, numerous federal courts have addressed a definitional issue
presented by conflicting Dodd-Frank provisions.82  The Dodd-Frank anti-
retaliation provision references whistleblowers that report wrongdoing to
73. See id. at *6 (holding against retroactivity based partly on lack of congres-
sional guidance).
74. No. 10–6082, 2014 WL 1744989 (D.N.J. Apr. 29, 2014), aff’d in part, va-
cated in part, No. 14–2734, 2015 WL 4430837 (3d Cir. July 21, 2015).
75. See id. at *1 (describing employment relationship between plaintiff and
defendant and “Defendant’s alleged retaliation against Plaintiff”).
76. See id. at *5 (noting plaintiff’s failure to prove he was within purview of
Dodd-Frank protections).
77. See id. at *4 (avoiding definitional issue); see also id. at *4–5 (describing
plaintiff as failing to qualify for protections of statute due to failure to make disclo-
sures of type protected by Dodd-Frank).
78. 776 F.3d 157 (3d Cir. 2015).
79. For a discussion of the Port Authority Trans-Hudson case, see infra note 80
and accompanying text. See also Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 776 F.3d at 159
(describing railroad worker anti-retaliation statute at issue in case).
80. See id. at 163 n.8 (“Of course, we would not allow considerations of the
purpose of an anti-retaliation provision to trump the statute’s text.  For example,
we recently rejected a rather plausible argument that a whistleblower provision
would be undermined, in favor of ‘Congress’s intent [as] clearly reflected in the
text and structure of [the Act].’” (alterations in original)).
81. For a further discussion of this jurisprudence, see infra notes 82–99 and
accompanying text.
82. For a discussion of the federal courts addressing a definitional issue in the
Dodd-Frank provisions, see infra notes 83–99 and accompanying text.
13
Lisman: Arbitration Agreement Arbitrage?: Statutory Discrepancy Leads to
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2016
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\60-4\VLR404.txt unknown Seq: 14 19-NOV-15 15:04
766 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60: p. 753
the SEC.83  The definitional gap lies in whether whistleblowers who en-
gage in internal reporting can invoke anti-retaliation protections.84
District court decisions on the definitional issue have been wide-rang-
ing and ultimately have arrived at opposing resolutions.85  In Asadi v. G.E.
Energy,86 the Fifth Circuit became the first circuit court to address this
issue and took a narrow approach by holding that internal whistleblowers
could not invoke the Dodd-Frank anti-retaliation protections.87  The Asadi
opinion has not passed without criticism, but it stands as the only circuit
decision on the definitional issue thus far.88
Second, courts have encountered potential foreign application of the
Dodd-Frank whistleblower anti-retaliation provisions.89  In Meng-Lin v. Sie-
mens AG,90 the Second Circuit declined to extend Dodd-Frank anti-retalia-
tion protections extraterritorially.91  A whistleblower alleged that he was
fired for reporting misconduct, but all operative events in the case took
place abroad.92  The Second Circuit was not persuaded that Dodd-Frank
protections should have extraterritorial application.93
83. See Pacella, supra note 29, at 723 (detailing definitions in operative section
of Dodd-Frank); see also Leifer, supra note 42, at 123 (describing definitional issue
as “an internal inconsistency in the way that the statute defines ‘whistleblower’”).
84. See Leifer, supra note 42, at 123–24 (elaborating on “disagreement” that
definitional point has engendered); see also Pacella, supra note 29, at 723 (stating
that subsections have “created ambiguity”).
85. See Pacella, supra note 29, at 733–41 (outlining diverse federal district
court decisions addressing definitional issue).
86. 720 F.3d 620 (5th Cir. 2013).
87. See Asadi, 720 F.3d at 625 (holding Dodd-Frank only protects
whistleblowers who first report to SEC); see also Pacella, supra note 29, at 743 (char-
acterizing Asadi holding).
88. See, e.g., Pacella, supra note 29, at 725–26 (outlining reasons why Asadi
decision is “alarming” and might precipitate more case law).
89. For a discussion of the Second Circuit’s treatment of Dodd-Frank’s
whistleblower provisions, see infra notes 90–93 and accompanying text.
90. 763 F.3d 175 (2d Cir. 2014).
91. See id. at 176–77 (summarizing reasoning and conclusion that Dodd-Frank
anti-retaliation protections do not apply extraterritorially).  The issue of extraterri-
torial application came before the Fifth Circuit in Asadi, but the court chose to
resolve the case on a definitional point. See Pacella, supra note 29, at 724–25
(describing lower court holding in Asadi as grounded in extraterritoriality).
92. See Meng-Lin, 763 F.3d at 177–78 (describing allegations that plaintiff re-
ported information that company was engaging in improper payments to officials
of Asian governments and subsequent employment restrictions ultimately resulting
in termination).  The Taiwanese plaintiff was employed by a Chinese subsidiary
corporation of a German parent corporation. See id. at 177 (reviewing citizenship
and employment of plaintiff within subsidiary and parent companies).
93. See id. at 179–80 (labeling plaintiff’s arguments in favor of extraterritorial
application “unavailing”); id. at 183 (citing lack of explicit congressional intent as
driving decision).  Reminiscent of arguments in Ruhe and Murray, the plaintiff ar-
gued that Dodd-Frank exposed a congressional intention for extraterritorial reach.
See id. at 180 (holding that Dodd-Frank “contains no hint” indicating extraterrito-
rial application).
14
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Third, there is wide judicial disagreement over retroactive application
of the Dodd-Frank whistleblower protections, and confusing congressional
intent is partly responsible.94  Plaintiffs have attempted to apply Dodd-
Frank protections to conduct occurring prior to passage of the law.95  In
particular, the Dodd-Frank amendment to SOX that invalidates predis-
pute arbitration agreements has spurred a flurry of decisions.96  District
court decisions in Pezza v. Investors Capital Corp.97 and Henderson v. Masco
Framing Corp.98 demonstrate the split between federal courts on the retro-
activity issue.99
III. ARBITRAGING THE DISCREPANCY: THE THIRD CIRCUIT TAKES THE
NARROW APPROACH AND DECLINES TO READ IN AN
INVALIDATING PROVISION IN KHAZIN
The Third Circuit addressed the odd discrepancy in Dodd-Frank and
analyzed the absence of a provision invalidating predispute arbitration
agreements in the section of Dodd-Frank that governs the new SEC pro-
gram.100  Despite arguments to read such a provision in and preserve the
intent of Dodd-Frank to protect whistleblowers, the Third Circuit was not
convinced that such judicial action was warranted.101
94. See Hannah Garden-Monheit, Comment, Using Severability Doctrine to Solve
the Retroactivity Unit-of-Analysis Puzzle: A Dodd-Frank Case Study, 80 U. CHI. L. REV.
1885, 1893–94 (2013) (stating that resolution of Dodd-Frank retroactivity issue by
federal district courts has “yielded unpredictable results” and identifying unclear
congressional intent as “play[ing] a central role” in diverse retroactivity analyses).
In particular, there has been wide disagreement as to the retroactivity of the Dodd-
Frank amendments to SOX whistleblower provisions and, more specifically, the
amendment invalidating predispute arbitration agreements. See id. at 1894–95
(outlining retroactivity problems as to “five Dodd-Frank amendments to SOX” in-
cluding predispute arbitration provision).  Retroactivity of statutes presents an is-
sue governed by Supreme Court case law. See id. at 1893–95 (describing Supreme
Court framework for analysis of retroactivity of statute);  Nerderman, supra note
42, at 2159 (describing retroactivity analysis as matter of constitutional law ad-
dressed by Supreme Court).
95. See Nerderman, supra note 42, at 2164 (describing plaintiff’s attempt to
apply Dodd-Frank amendment, invalidating predispute arbitration agreements to
conduct occurring before passage of Dodd-Frank, to SOX).
96. See Garden-Monheit, supra note 94, at 1895 (labeling this particular provi-
sion the most problematic).
97. 767 F. Supp. 2d 225 (D. Mass. 2011).
98. No. 3:11–CV–00088–LRH, 2011 WL 3022535 (D. Nev. July 22, 2011).
99. See generally Garden-Monheit, supra note 94, at 1897 (summarizing Hender-
son holding that reached opposite resolution following Pezza); Nerderman, supra
note 42, at 2159 (juxtaposing Pezza holding with Henderson holding).  The parties
in each case elicited mixed responses on their congressional intent arguments.
Compare Pezza, 767 F. Supp. 2d at 233 (labeling congressional intent as to retroac-
tive applicability “unclear” and applying predispute arbitration provision retroac-
tively), with Henderson, 2011 WL 3022535, at *4 (stating nothing on congressional
intent and declining to apply predispute arbitration provision retroactively).
100. For a discussion of the Khazin court’s treatment of the Dodd-Frank dis-
crepancy and the court’s analysis, see infra notes 109–21 and accompanying text.
101. See infra notes 119–21.
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A. Blowing the Whistle: Facts and Background of Khazin
Boris Khazin was employed by TD Ameritrade (TD) and conducted
due diligence analysis on TD’s products.102  In the course of his employ-
ment, Khazin became aware of a pricing issue that ran afoul of securities
laws, which he presented to one of his superiors.103  As instructed by his
supervisor, Khazin studied effects of re-pricing the product and discovered
that TD would experience negative revenue impacts from such repric-
ing.104  Though instructed to cease investigation of the issue, Khazin per-
sisted and was fired several months later.105
Khazin initially filed several state law claims as well as a Dodd-Frank
claim in New Jersey state court.106  Khazin later brought the Dodd-Frank
claim in federal court.107  The United States District Court for the District
of New Jersey dismissed the Dodd-Frank claim and compelled arbitration
based on a retroactivity analysis.108
102. Khazin v. TD Ameritrade Holding Corp., 773 F.3d 488, 489 (3d Cir.
2014) (describing employment responsibilities of Khazin as “performing due dili-
gence on financial products offered to TD customers”); see also Khazin v. TD Amer-
itrade Holding Corp., No. 13-4149 (SDW) (MCA), 2014 WL 940703, at *1 (D.N.J.
Mar. 11) (labeling Khazin “an investment oversight officer”), aff’d on other grounds
by 773 F.3d 488, 489 (3d Cir. 2014).  Khazin and TD entered into “an employment
agreement in which they agreed to arbitrate all disputes arising out of Khazin’s
employment.” Khazin, 773 F.3d at 489.
103. See Khazin, 773 F.3d at 489 (describing discovery that one product “was
priced in a manner that did not comply with the relevant securities regulations”
and subsequent reporting of issue); see also Khazin, 2014 WL 940703, at *1 (noting
improper pricing “would result in customers paying additional overhead for the
product”).
104. See Khazin, 773 F.3d at 489 (detailing discoveries of revenue analysis of
re-price as showing “that although remedying the violation would save customers
$2,000,000, it would cost TD $1,150,000 in revenues and negatively impact the
balance sheet of” other divisions overseen by Khazin’s supervisor).
105. See id. at 490 (reviewing instructions of supervisor to Khazin “not to cor-
rect the problem and to stop sending her emails on the subject”); id. at 489–90
(noting Kazin approached supervisor again to discuss “changing the price to rem-
edy the violation”); id. at 490 (stating Khazin was terminated after months of con-
flict regarding his employment).  Once Khazin brought up the issue after he was
instructed to ignore it, TD leveled accusations that Khazin had been involved in
wrongdoing in his employment. See id. (describing confrontation regarding “bill-
ing irregularity”); Khazin, 2014 WL 940703, at *1 (detailing initial accusations of
TD against Khazin).  Khazin’s firing was premised on those accusations. See
Khazin, 773 F.3d at 490 (noting “Khazin was told that he could no longer be
trusted” and was fired).
106. See Khazin, 773 F.3d at 490 (explaining initial filings in Superior Court of
New Jersey).  The state law claims were dismissed in light of the arbitration provi-
sion in the employment agreement. See id. (stating that state court “compelled
arbitration of the state-law claims”).
107. See id. (outlining holding of state court and jurisdictional dismissal of
Dodd-Frank claim, and re-filing of claim in federal court).
108. See id. (describing ruling by federal district court that Dodd-Frank “did
not prohibit the enforcement of arbitration agreements” retroactively).  The lower
court engaged in a retroactivity analysis driven by the Supreme Court precedent.
See id. (summarizing lower court ruling on retroactivity).
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B. Defendant Profits from Discrepancy: Third Circuit Analyzes the Absence of a
Predispute Arbitration Provision in Laws Governing the New SEC
Program
The Third Circuit first discussed and focused on the SEC bounty pro-
gram created by Dodd-Frank.109  The court noted the differences between
Dodd-Frank provisions governing the SEC program and Dodd-Frank
amendments to other whistleblower laws.110  In particular, the court drew
distinctions between the Dodd-Frank section on the SEC program and the
Dodd-Frank amendments to SOX.111  Khazin’s cause of action arose
under the provisions governing the SEC program.112
The court reviewed different aspects of Dodd-Frank and concluded
that the action was not subject to an anti-arbitration provision.113  The
Third Circuit thought the lack of an anti-arbitration provision in Dodd-
Frank indicated a “deliberate” decision by Congress.114  Though Khazin
asserted that this omission could not be reconciled with the broader goals
of Dodd-Frank, the court noted that Congress might have had good rea-
son “to exempt [the SEC program provision] claims from arbitration.”115
The federal preference for arbitration and existing case law on the arbitra-
tion issue compelled the court to follow this construction.116  Further, the
109. See id. at 491 (providing overview of Dodd-Frank and bounty program
created by legislation).
110. See id. at 492 (drawing differences between new SEC program and Dodd-
Frank amendments to other whistleblower laws).
111. See id. at 491 (drawing distinctions between SOX whistleblower provi-
sions as they existed both before and after Dodd-Frank amendments, and SEC
program).
112. See id. at 492 (identifying “type of claim that Khazin asserts” as new Dodd-
Frank cause of action).
113. See id. at 493 (stating broadly that “text and structure of Dodd-Frank”
favor court’s resolution of matter).
114. See id. at 492–93 (reviewing manner in which anti-arbitration provision
applies to SOX, CEA, and CFPA based on statutory location and pointing out con-
gressional action in “not append[ing] an anti-arbitration provision to the Dodd-
Frank cause of action while contemporaneously adding such provisions elsewhere”
as evidence “that the omission was deliberate”); id. at 495 (“Congress was not ‘si-
lent’ on the question of whether Dodd-Frank whistleblowers may avoid arbitration.
By adding anti-arbitration provisions to certain statutes but not others, it expressed
its intent unambiguously.”); id. at 493 (labeling difference between amendments
that invalidate arbitration agreements, and lack of parallel provision in SEC pro-
gram section “all the more glaring” since Congress addressed these issues all in
one section of Dodd-Frank).
115. Id. at 493 (noting that SOX and SEC program provisions “differ signifi-
cantly in a number of respects that might explain Congress’s reluctance to exempt
Dodd-Frank claims from arbitration”).
116. See id. (citing Federal Arbitration Act and underlying federal policy pre-
ferring arbitration in tandem with district court decisions in Ruhe and Murray for
proposition that arbitration should be allowed).  The plaintiff had argued that al-
lowing arbitration “would be counterintuitive” and “undermine” broader Dodd-
Frank whistleblower protection goals. See id.
17
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court recognized that rules promulgated after Dodd-Frank had no bearing
on the SEC program provisions.117
The Third Circuit finally noted that the Fourth Circuit’s Santoro deci-
sion focused on a different issue.118  According to the court, the “broad
language” of Santoro did not differentiate between the SEC program and
the other Dodd-Frank amendments.119  The court noted that the Santoro
decision failed to even mention the SEC program provisions.120  The
Third Circuit dismissed the complaint and compelled arbitration.121
IV. THE STATE OF THE MARKET: NARROW WHISTLEBLOWER
JURISPRUDENCE GIVES DEFENDANTS AN ADVANTAGE
Khazin represents cutting-edge precedent on a matter of first impres-
sion in the Third Circuit that is advantageous to corporate defendants.122
As such, practitioners who encounter Dodd-Frank whistleblower cases
should be aware of two primary issues.123  First, jurisprudence indicates
that courts will not broaden the whistleblower provisions.124  Second, cer-
tain policy considerations indicate that allowing arbitration of Dodd-Frank
whistleblower issues may be a prudent congressional choice.125
117. See id. at 494–95 (explaining that rules promulgated after passage of
Dodd-Frank do not refer to SEC program provision and as such, position of rules
on arbitration is irrelevant); id. at 494 (stating “regulatory actions” cited by plaintiff
“are of no help”).
118. See id. at 493–94 (noting that Santoro court addressed “an entirely differ-
ent issue” and that Santoro court “rejected Santoro’s interpretation of the anti-arbi-
tration provisions”).
119. Id. at 493 (finding that “although Santoro contains broad language”
about Dodd-Frank anti-retaliation provisions, opinion does not discuss SEC pro-
gram provision).
120. See id. (noting Santoro “did not even mention” SEC program provision
that is subject of Khazin).
121. See id. at 495 (“Khazin’s Dodd-Frank retaliation claim is not statutorily
exempt from the arbitration agreement with TD.  The District Court’s order dis-
missing the complaint and compelling arbitration will therefore be affirmed on
this ground.”).
122. For a detailed discussion of the Khazin decision and reasoning, see gen-
erally supra notes 102–27 and accompanying text.
123. For a further explanation of these issues, see infra notes 124–25 and ac-
companying text.
124. See supra notes 68–121 (explaining narrow construction of Dodd-Frank
whistleblower issue in Khazin, and other issues both in Third Circuit and beyond).
125. For an examination of policy points responsible for not forbidding arbi-
tration of whistleblower claims governing the SEC program, see infra notes 157–72
and accompanying text.
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A. Don’t Expect a Market Correction: Khazin Aligns with Jurisprudence
Showing Courts Are Unlikely to Broaden Dodd-Frank
Whistleblower Provisions
The Khazin decision, when positioned among other Dodd-Frank juris-
prudence, exposes two main trends.126  First, recent opinions indicate that
courts will not read an anti-arbitration clause in the SEC program provi-
sions of Dodd-Frank.127  The Khazin court, like others, refused to view the
absence of an invalidating provision as an inadvertent mistake.128  Instead,
the court interpreted the lack of an anti-arbitration section in the SEC
program provisions as a “deliberate” legislative choice.129  Similarly, the
courts in Murray and Ruhe were weary of reading in a provision based on a
goal of purportedly preserving broader purposes of Dodd-Frank.130  In
fact, the Third Circuit recently referenced Khazin and reaffirmed its deci-
sion to prohibit an arguable interpretation of legislative intent from out-
weighing the plain language of anti-retaliation statutes.131
Second, the opinions are also driven by the strong federal preference
for arbitration.132  The Khazin court noted clear federal directives regard-
126. For a discussion of common threads among the decisions, see infra notes
127–50 and accompanying text.
127. See generally Khazin v. TD Ameritrade Holding Corp., 773 F.3d 488, 492
(3d Cir. 2014) (finding “text and structure of Dodd-Frank” fail to protect plaintiff
from being compelled to arbitrate claims); Murray v. UBS Sec., LLC, No. 12 Civ.
5914(KPF), 2014 WL 285093, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 27, 2014) (stating “nothing in
the statutory text” of Dodd-Frank clearly forbids operation of predispute arbitra-
tion agreements); Ruhe v. Masimo Corp., No. SACV 11-00734-CJC(JCGx), 2011
WL 4442790, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2011) (declining to read in arbitration
agreement invalidating provision as it would require “ignoring the plain language
of the statute”), appeal docketed, No. 14-55556 (9th Cir. Apr. 7, 2014), and appeal
docketed, No. 14-55725 (9th Cir. May 2, 2014).
128. See Khazin, 773 F.3d at 492–93 (“Recognizing that no provision expressly
restricts the arbitration of Dodd-Frank retaliation claims, Khazin contends that a
bill as massive as Dodd-Frank will inevitably contain gaps not intended by
Congress.”).
129. Id.
130. See Murray, 2014 WL 285093, at *11 (declining to cross apply arbitration
provisions from other laws to Dodd-Frank whistleblower law and interpreting “this
absence to demonstrate Congress’ intent that the Anti-Retaliation Provision [of the
Dodd-Frank whistleblower program] not include any prohibition against predis-
pute arbitration agreements”); Ruhe, 2011 WL 4442790, at *4 (deciding that “insuf-
ficient evidence” exists to support judicial conclusion that provision invalidating
predispute arbitration agreements should be read into Dodd-Frank anti-retaliation
provision).
131. See Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 776 F.3d 157,
163 n.8 (3d Cir. 2015) (citing to Khazin and reaffirming that text of anti-retaliation
statutes will be strictly followed).
132. See generally Khazin, 773 F.3d at 493 (discussing arbitration issues involved
in federal law); Murray, 2014 WL 285093, at *3 (expounding on FAA that informs
case and arbitration issues); Ruhe, 2011 WL 4442790, at *1 (reviewing governing
federal precedent relative to enforcement of arbitration agreements).
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ing arbitration.133  Similarly, the Ruhe and Murray courts both cited to the
same federal preference in their decisions.134  Courts consistently recog-
nize the strength of this preference and, absent a clear textual command,
enforce it.135
In addition, Third Circuit jurisprudence regarding other aspects of
Dodd-Frank exposes the same concerns and a narrow construction of the
whistleblower provisions.136  The Sefen and Safarian decisions are two
prime examples of this narrow Dodd-Frank jurisprudence in the Third
Circuit.137  First, the Sefen court narrowly interpreted the issue of retroac-
tive application of Dodd-Frank amendments to the FCA anti-retaliation
provisions.138  Unclear legislative intent drove the court’s reasoning in a
manner similar to that in the Khazin decision.139 Sefen affirmed further
reluctance to apply a more expansive reading of Dodd-Frank absent a
clear congressional command.140
Second, the Safarian court took a narrow view of an aspect of the
Dodd-Frank definitional issue, specifically whether the plaintiff properly
made necessary disclosures.141 Safarian admittedly circumvented the
tougher definitional issue addressed by other courts.142  However, taken
133. See Khazin, 773 F.3d at 493 (“This legislative choice must be respected,
especially in light of the ‘liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements’
embodied in the Federal Arbitration Act.”).
134. See Murray, 2014 WL 285093, at *3 (discussing manner in which FAA
directs arbitration agreements be treated deferentially by courts); Ruhe, 2011 WL
4442790, at *1 (“Federal law strongly favors agreements to arbitrate.”).
135. See infra notes 148–53.  The preference for arbitration has proliferated
recently and has grown stronger. See Nerderman, supra note 42, at 2146–47 (out-
lining aspects of FAA as effecting wider federal judicial acceptance of arbitration
and wide reach of FAA in lending favor to arbitration and arbitration agreements).
136. For an examination of Third Circuit jurisprudence, see supra notes
68–80 and accompanying text.
137. See Sefen v. Animas Corp., No. 10-2971, 2014 WL 2710957, at *9 (E.D. Pa.
June 13, 2014) (holding that claim is “untimely” due to disagreement with plain-
tiff’s argument on retroactive application of statute); Safarian v. Am. DG Energy,
Inc., No. 10-6082, 2014 WL 1744989 (D.N.J. Apr. 29, 2014), aff’d in part, vacated in
part by No. 14–2734, 2015 WL 4430837 (3d Cir. July 21, 2015).
138. See Sefen, 2014 WL 2710957, at *6 (declining to apply amendment ex-
tending statute of limitation and refusing to extend new benefit to plaintiff).
139. See id. at *5 (attributing decision in part to lack of “clear and unambigu-
ous guidance from Congress regarding retroactivity”).
140. See generally id. (outlining reasoning for decision).
141. See Safarian, 2014 WL 1744989, at *4 (discussing manner in which plain-
tiff failed to properly disclose violations of SOX and thus failed to invoke anti-
retaliation protections as outlined in Dodd-Frank whistleblower program); id. at
*3–4 (declining to review reporting requirement issue and deciding case based on
type of information reported and whether such information properly warranted
protection under anti-retaliation provision of Dodd-Frank).
142. For a discussion of Safarian, see supra notes 74–77 and accompanying
text.
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together, Safarian, Sefen, and Khazin arguably indicate narrow Third Cir-
cuit jurisprudence regarding Dodd-Frank whistleblower law.143
Finally, beyond the Third Circuit, most federal courts have also re-
solved other Dodd-Frank issues narrowly.144  The only circuit court to de-
cide the definitional issue has elected to follow the narrow resolution.145
Potential extraterritoriality of Dodd-Frank protections has also been nar-
rowly interpreted, evidenced by the Second Circuit’s opinion in Meng-
Lin.146  Further, decisions regarding retroactivity have come out largely
against retroactive application.147
The problem of unclear congressional intent has driven each of these
issues.148  The concerns that prompted the Fifth Circuit to decide the defi-
nitional issue in Asadi echoed the concerns of the Third Circuit in
Khazin.149  Similarly, there is no clear congressional intent regarding the
extraterritoriality of Dodd-Frank anti-retaliation protections.150  Address-
ing extraterritoriality, the Second Circuit opinion in Liu Meng-Lin reaf-
143. For a discussion of the three Third Circuit cases, see supra notes 68–80
and accompanying text.
144. For a discussion of other federal courts that have narrowly construed
these issues, see supra notes 81–99 and accompanying text.
145. See Pacella, supra note 29, at 741–43 (noting Fifth Circuit was first circuit-
level court to decide issue and pointing out that Asadi opinion refused to extend
protection to plaintiff based on failure to properly qualify under Dodd-Frank defi-
nition of whistleblower).  Decisions regarding this definitional issue are admittedly
less cohesively narrow. See id. at 733 (describing early district court jurisprudence
regarding definitional point as affording protection to whistleblowers who report
internally just as to whistleblowers who report externally).  In an analysis that ran
counter to other judicial responses to Dodd-Frank, one district court addressed the
ambiguous congressional intent by attempting to derive congressional goals from
other sections of the statute. See id. at 734 (detailing one decision that examined
other sections of Dodd-Frank in order to identify congressional intent).
146. For a discussion of the Liu Meng-Lin decision, see supra notes 90–93 and
accompanying text.
147. See Oberti, supra note 41, at 113 (“Most courts have held [the Dodd-
Frank amendment to SOX that invalidates predispute arbitration agreements] is
not retroactive, although one court has held that it is retroactive.  At this point, the
clear trend is against retroactivity.” (footnote omitted)); see also Saranac Hale Spen-
cer, Third Circuit Eyes Dodd-Frank’s Whistleblower Protection, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER
(Oct. 24, 2014), http://www.thelegalintelligencer.com/id=1202674423094/Third-
Circuit-Eyes-DoddFranks-Whistleblower-Protection?slreturn=20150318150605
[http://perma.cc/GTH-2NKG] (noting that out of “about a dozen cases” decided
on retroactivity question only “two” have sided with pro-plaintiff view).
148. For an examination of the problems posed by unclear congressional in-
tent, see infra notes 167–72 and accompanying text.
149. See Asadi v. GE Energy (USA), LLC, 720 F.3d 620, 630 (5th Cir. 2013)
(referring to text and “plain language” of statute in order to derive congressional
intent).
150. See Liu Meng-Lin v. Siemens AG, 763 F.3d 175, 180 (2d Cir. 2014) (dis-
cussing “absence of any direct evidence of a congressional intent” directing extra-
territorial application of Dodd-Frank anti-retaliation protections as reason for
holding against extraterritorial application).  As in Khazin, the only arguments in
favor of extraterritorial application are based on other aspects of Dodd-Frank. See
id. at 180–81 (reviewing plaintiff arguments for extraterritorial application of stat-
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firmed a general judicial unwillingness to wade into unspoken
congressional intentions.151  Finally, unclear congressional intent plays a
major role in retroactivity decisions.152  A lack of explicit intent leaves
courts reluctant to retroactively apply the law despite compelling argu-
ments to the contrary.153
Overall, whether it is the precise arbitration issue in Khazin or an-
other aspect of the Dodd-Frank whistleblower provisions, plaintiff argu-
ments to extend the law beyond its clear boundaries continue to fall
short.154  Defendants have the upper hand on Dodd-Frank issues both
within the Third Circuit and nationally.155  Practitioners moving forward
with Dodd-Frank whistleblower litigation should be aware of each of these
trends as they continue to litigate anti-retaliation claims.156
ute and holding that no argument meets high standard required to rule in favor of
extraterritorial application).
151. See id. at 183 (refusing to engage in extraterritorial application of Dodd-
Frank whistleblower provisions due to lack of “explicit statutory evidence” di-
recting such application and despite “tangential indications” directing such appli-
cation submitted by plaintiff).
152. See Garden-Monheit, supra note 94, at 1895–98 (pointing out judicial re-
sponses to arguments regarding congressional intent including courts holding that
no clear intent on retroactivity had been indicated and deferring chance to rule
on intent).
153. See Wong v. CKX, Inc., 890 F. Supp. 2d 411, 422 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (“The
first step [in determining congressional intent per the Landgraf standard] thus
provides no clear answer to the question of retroactivity.”); Leshinsky v. Telvent
GIT, S.A., 873 F. Supp. 2d 582, 592 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (“That is, in the absence of
other direct evidence in the text or structure of the statutory amendment as to
Congress’s intent on the issue, the language in the Senate Report provides some
evidence (albeit not overwhelming or dispositive evidence) that the amendment
was intended to be a ‘clarification,’ rather than a substantively new rule of law.”);
Taylor v. Fannie Mae, 839 F. Supp. 2d 259, 262 n.3 (D.D.C. 2012) (“All courts that
have addressed this issue agree that the portions of the Dodd-Frank Act addressing
predispute arbitration do not evidence any express intent from Congress that they
be applied retroactively.”); Holmes v. Air Liquide USA LLC, No. H–11–2580, 2012
WL 267194, at *6 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 30, 2012) (“The Court begins its analysis by agree-
ing with both the Pezza and Henderson courts that the portions of Dodd-Frank ad-
dressing predispute arbitration do not evidence any intent to apply retroactively.”);
Henderson v. Masco Framing Corp., No. 3:11-CV-00088-LRH, 2011 WL 3022535, at
*4 (D. Nev. July 22, 2011) (holding against retroactive application without ruling
on congressional intent); Pezza v. Investors Capital Corp., 767 F. Supp. 2d 225, 228
(D. Mass. 2011) (“Nothing in Section 922 of the [Dodd-Frank] Act provides an
express congressional intent regarding retroactivity.”).
154. For a discussion of why plaintiffs have been unsuccessful, see generally
infra notes 186–94.
155. Id.
156. For a further discussion of the specific manner in which this jurispru-
dence should inform practitioners, see infra notes 173–94 and accompanying text.
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B. Market Inefficiency or Reasonable Discrepancy?: Omission of an
Anti-Arbitration Provision as a Reasonable Policy Choice
In Khazin, the Third Circuit speculated that the omission of a predis-
pute arbitration provision in the SEC program might have been a reasona-
ble congressional choice.157  There are two policy factors that support
allowing arbitration of Dodd-Frank retaliation claims.158  First, there are
important differences between protections in the SEC program and in
SOX.159  Second, the SEC program has potential to negatively affect cor-
porate culture.160
Whistleblowers reporting violations of securities laws can invoke pro-
tections under either SOX or the SEC program, but the protections are
different.161  Two differences between causes of action under SOX and
the SEC program support a narrow construction of the latter.162  First,
SOX contains a procedural hurdle not applicable to the SEC program.163
Second, the remedies under the SOX provisions are limited compared to
the potential recovery sharing under the SEC program.164  The lessened
procedural control and heightened potential rewards have been identified
as potential avenues of false reporting.165  Allowing arbitration of claims
157. See Khazin v. TD Ameritrade Holding Corp., 773 F.3d 488, 493 (3d Cir.
2014) (“As explained above, however, the Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank causes
of action differ significantly in a number of respects that might explain Congress’s
reluctance to exempt Dodd-Frank claims from arbitration.”).
158. See infra notes 159–72 and accompanying text.
159. See infra notes 161–66 and accompanying text.
160. See infra notes 167–72 and accompanying text.
161. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1) (2012) (forbidding retaliation against
employees who report wrongdoing relative to conduct violating securities laws),
with 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(i)–(iii) (2012) (outlining retaliation protections
as to whistleblowers reporting under new SEC program).
162. See infra notes 163–66 and accompanying text.
163. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(1)(A) (requiring complainant to file ini-
tial complaint with Secretary of Labor), with 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A) (outlining
anti-retaliation cause of action, but not requiring any initial complaint to be filed
with any agency). See also Hartmann, supra note 24, at 1296 (“It is important to
note that the Dodd-Frank Act does not completely usurp Sarbanes-Oxley’s admin-
istrative process; rather, it creates an entirely new and separate enforcement mech-
anism for retaliation claims that parallels the existing regime under Sarbanes-
Oxley.  Therefore, the Dodd-Frank Act simultaneously enhances the protections
available to whistleblowers under Sarbanes-Oxley but also creates a separate en-
forcement mechanism for claims brought under the SEC or CFTC.” (footnote
omitted)).
164. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(c)(2)(A)–(C) (stating available remedies as
including reinstatement to job, back pay plus interest, and special damages
compensation), with 15 U.S.C. § 78u–6(h)(1)(C) (outlining substantially same
remedies for anti-retaliation), and id. § 78u-6(b)(1)(A)–(B) (outlining potential
recovery-sharing amounts to be awarded to whistleblowers under certain
circumstances).
165. See Desai, supra note 26, at 457–58 (outlining threat of false reporting);
Ebersole, supra note 50, at 145 (explaining lack of repercussion for false reporting
under Dodd-Frank); id. at 135 (noting Dodd-Frank “is likely to incentivize frivo-
lous, misleading, exaggerated or otherwise unreliable tips”).
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to be brought pursuant to the SEC program provisions, therefore, might
mediate the wider latitude of whistleblower claims brought under the
lower procedural safeguards and higher potential bounty rewards inher-
ent in Dodd-Frank.166
Dodd-Frank has elicited criticism because of the potential dangers it
poses to corporate culture.167  Commentators speculate that while Con-
gress had seemingly innocuous intentions to incentivize and protect
whistleblowers under the Act, in execution, the SEC program has perhaps
spurred further corporate fraud.168  The original version of SOX directed
corporations to design and implement stronger internal procedures to
catch wrongdoing.169  The SEC bounty program undermines those very
controls by luring whistleblowers outside the company, circumventing the
internal controls of business organizations across the nation.170  The SEC
program also has the potential to encourage whistleblowers to delay re-
porting instead of immediately exposing wrongdoing in order to increase
their monetary rewards.171  Arbitration could feasibly serve to counterbal-
ance these potential negative effects.172
V. PORTFOLIO PLANNING FOR THE FUTURE: THE IMPACT OF THE
KHAZIN DECISION ON CORPORATE DEFENDANTS AND
WHISTLEBLOWING PLAINTIFFS
While Khazin favors defendants, the decision and other whistleblower
jurisprudence should serve to inform practitioners in two ways.173  First,
defendants can take advantage of the Khazin precedent while plaintiffs can
preserve their chance for success.174  Second, defense counsel represent-
ing financial services firms should utilize predispute arbitration clauses in
their employment agreements.175  On the other hand, plaintiffs should
consider potentially pursuing whistleblower claims under SOX to avoid
arbitration.176
166. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
167. See infra notes 169–72 and accompanying text.
168. See id.
169. See Pacella, supra note 29, at 751–52 (discussing SOX requirements for
“internal reporting” mechanisms).
170. See Ashcroft et al., supra note 24, at 386 (reviewing concerns about
threats to internal compliance systems); Hartmann, supra note 24, at 1307 (outlin-
ing theory that Dodd-Frank incentive program will encourage whistleblowers to
avoid internal controls and “report externally first”).
171. See Ashcroft et al., supra note 24, at 387 (describing theory that
whistleblowers might actually wait to report corporate misconduct in order to grow
size of potential award); Rapp, supra note 25, at 93–94 (describing same theory).
172. See infra note 178 and accompanying text.
173. For a further discussion of how Khazin should inform practitioners, see
infra notes 183–98 and accompanying text.
174. For a further discussion of how Khazin should inform practitioners, see
infra notes 177–98 and accompanying text.
175. See infra notes 177–85 and accompanying text.
176. See infra notes 186–94 and accompanying text.
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A. Attorneys for Employers: Exploit the Discrepancy
For defense attorneys, the Khazin decision and surrounding jurispru-
dence indicates counsel should encourage clients to utilize predispute ar-
bitration clauses.177  Such clauses will provide a clear method of
arbitrating retaliation disputes that arise under the SEC bounty program
provisions in the Third Circuit and possibly in other circuits as well.178
Though there has not been a plethora of litigation on the topic, each
court that has addressed the absence of the predispute arbitration provi-
sion in the SEC program laws has declined to read one in.179  Not only
have the resolutions of these cases been the same, each has engaged in a
similar analysis.180
Defense counsel might also consider utilizing the body of narrow ju-
risprudence regarding the SEC program generally to defend their position
on other whistleblower issues.181  This trend is apparent in the Third Cir-
cuit and beyond.182  Policy arguments on the potentially negative effects
of the SEC program can also serve to augment defendants’ positions in
lawsuits on other Dodd-Frank whistleblower issues.183  That said, the ab-
sence of the predispute arbitration agreement in the SEC program does
not leave defendants completely off the hook.184  To be sure, SOX, CEA,
and CFPA all similarly invalidate predispute arbitration agreements, so de-
fendants will have to face anti-retaliation claims brought under those pro-
visions in court.185
B. Attorneys for Whistleblowers: Change the Strategy
For attorneys representing whistleblowers, the Khazin decision directs
careful considerations moving forward.186  Despite an arguable incongru-
ence with Dodd-Frank, plaintiffs should not expect courts in other circuits
to read in an anti-arbitration provision.187  Arguments to read in an invali-
177. See Hamid et al., supra note 1, at 2 (labeling Khazin decision one that R
advantages employers).
178. See id. at 3 (noting that “[i]t remains to be seen” whether additional
courts will follow the Khazin reasoning on the arbitration agreement issue).
179. See supra notes 55–99 (discussing judicial opinions that have declined to
read anti-arbitration provision into sections governing new SEC program).
180. But see infra note 181 and accompanying text (discussing of cases reach-
ing varying conclusions).
181. See infra notes 182–85 and accompanying text.
182. See supra notes 55–99 and accompanying text.
183. See supra notes 157–72 and accompanying text.
184. See supra notes 55–67 and accompanying text.
185. See supra notes 41–47 and accompanying text.
186. See infra notes 187–94.
187. Compare Desai, supra note 26, at 460 (noting Dodd-Frank “goal” of
whistleblower activity), and Pacella, supra note 29, at 727 (emphasizing importance
Dodd-Frank placed on whistleblowers), with Khazin v. TD Ameritrade Holding
Corp., 773 F.3d 488, 492 (3d Cir. 2014) (expressing shortcomings of plaintiff argu-
ment that absence of equivalent provision in Dodd-Frank was predictable mistake).
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dating provision are likely futile given three courts have declined to do so
thus far.188  In post-Khazin jurisprudence, plaintiffs must choose their
cause of action carefully and perhaps consider taking advantage of
SOX.189
Under SOX, a whistleblower will forgo the potentially higher awards
and stronger remedies available under the SEC program.190  But the SOX
anti-retaliation provisions clearly preempt and invalidate arbitration agree-
ments.191  Plaintiffs subject to arbitration clauses should pursue anti-retali-
ation claims under SOX to avoid arbitration.192  If plaintiffs are
attempting to take advantage of the SEC program (which also allows re-
covery-sharing for reporting SOX violations), they might also consider
preparing to repackage any Dodd-Frank anti-retaliation claims into SOX
claims.193  However, pleadings should be specific and perhaps plead
under Dodd-Frank, and SOX in the alternative, to avoid inadvertently for-
going SOX protection.194
188. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
189. See Buergel et al., supra note 13 (“[P]otential plaintiffs who are signato-
ries to arbitration agreements will be forced to choose whether to assert SOX
claims in a judicial forum, or Dodd-Frank claims in an arbitral forum”); Oberst,
supra note 12 (“This distinction [of Dodd-Frank claims being subject to arbitration
clauses while SOX claims are not] may be important to employee-side attorneys in
deciding how to proceed on behalf of a financial whistleblower client.  There ap-
pears to be some overlap between SOX and the new Dodd-Frank claims, but an
employee may have no judicial remedy if they are subject to mandatory arbitration
and also fail to exhaust the administrative remedies necessary to bring a SOX
claim.”).
190. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(b)(1) (2012) (outlining potential
whistleblower rewards of between 10 and 30% of recoveries over $1 million for
participation in SEC program), and id. § 78u-6(h)(1)(C) (outlining anti-retaliation
remedies under SEC program claim, including “2 times the amount of back pay”),
with 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(c) (2012) (outlining anti-retaliation remedies under SOX
claim, including only “back pay”). See also Buergel et al., supra note 13 (discussing
negative aspects of pursuing a SOX claim, namely “forgo[ing] [ ] heightened rem-
edies” of Dodd-Frank).
191. See generally Buergel et. al., supra note 13; Oberst, supra note 12.
192. See Buergel et al., supra note 13 (explaining plaintiff’s choice “judicial
forum” and “arbitral forum”); see also Oberst, supra note 12 (noting employees
want to avoid arbitration).
193. See Khazin v. TD Ameritrade Holding Corp., 773 F.3d 488, 492 (3d Cir.
2014) (explaining that provision invalidating arbitration agreements was attached
to SOX anti-retaliation cause of action only); id. at 491 (outlining lesser remedies
available under SOX anti-retaliation cause of action); Buergel et al., supra note 13
(noting plaintiff choice grounded in fact that “the conduct prescribed by both
[the SEC program and SOX] statutes is in most cases identical”).
194. See Khazin, 773 F.3d at 492 (noting that plaintiff “assert[ed] only a Dodd-
Frank claim” and thus could not claim protection of provisions invalidating arbi-
tration agreements as to SOX, CEA, or CFPA claims); see also Murray v. UBS Sec.,
LLC, No. 12 Civ. 5914(KPF), 2014 WL 285093, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 27, 2014) (hold-
ing that “[p]laintiff cannot recast his claim” under SOX to benefit from SOX pro-
vision invalidating arbitration agreements).  Indeed, the plaintiff in Murray made
this very mistake and lost any chance of invoking the SOX protections. See id.
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VI. LIQUIDATE OR REALLOCATE?: THIRD CIRCUIT SETTLES ARBITRATION
PROVISION ISSUE, SETS STAGE FOR FUTURE
Despite what now seems to be a commonly held misconception,
claims brought under the SEC whistleblower program are subject to arbi-
tration in the Third Circuit.195  Viewed in light of other jurisprudence, the
Khazin decision changes the landscape of Dodd-Frank whistleblower litiga-
tion.196  Regardless of the initial surprise about the decision, litigants must
be vigilant moving forward.197  An understanding of these issues will assist
practitioners on both sides of whistleblower law to strategize
accordingly.198
195. See Khazin, 773 F.3d at 489 (describing holding).
196. See Buergel et al., supra note 13, (stating Khazin “has important practical
consequences for employers” and informs plaintiffs).
197. See id.
198. For practitioner advice, see generally supra notes 173–94.
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